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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE S'TATE OF UTAH

8

STANFORD ll. PETERSEN and
CAROL A. PETERSEN, his wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
8

9
4

vs.
INTERMOlJNTAIN CAPITAL
CORPORATION,
D-efendant-Respondent.

D. SPENCER NILSON,
vs.

Case No.
12984

Plaintiff,

STANFORD B. PETERSEN, et. al.,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE1\1ENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs, Petersens sued Defendant, Intermountain Capital Corporation, for damages by reason of an
alleged breach of contract. Involved in the transactions
between the parties was a Promissory Note and l\'lort1

gage, executed by Plaintiffs in favor of Defendant. The
foreclosure of the Note and Mortgage was later brought
in a separate case and the lower court consolidated the
two cases, treating the second case as a counterclaim.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\i\TER COURT
Judgment was granted by the trial court inf avor of
Defendant on the counterclaim for the amount of the
Note, interest and attorney's fees and a foreclosure of
the Mortgage. The Plaintiffs' Complaint was dismissed
upon its merits and with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As in Plaintiffs-Appellants' Brief, Plaintiffs shall
be referred to as Petersen and Defendant, Intermoun·
tain Capital Corporation, shall be referred to as ICC.
Appellants' Statement of Facts is incomplete and
must be enlarged.
In the exchange of properties between Petersens
and ICC, as shown in the January 22, 1966 agreement
( Exh. 8-P) , there was a provision (Paragraph 5) con·
templating a future loan of $20,000.00 within one year,
and with I CC solely to determine the time, and provid·
ing for a Promissory Note at 9 per cent per annum to be
paid in three equal annual installments with a Firs'I
Mortgage on the Wyoming Properties as the security.
The Wyoming Properties were involved in the exchange
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agreement, known by ICC and valued at least in the
sum of $u7 ,200.00 ( Exh. 4-D).
Money was very tight, in fact the tightest money
market in the history of the country, and not available to
loan by ICC to Petersen during 1966 and early 1967 (R.
46, 47, 48, 59, 61, 70) although attempts were made by
ICC to help and to offer some of their receivables, or
their other property, to Petersen to try and generate the
funds, but each time Petersen indicated that he could
wait. These conversations also extended beyond the years
time of January 22, 1967 (R. 70).
On April 5, 1967, a demand was made by letter to
ICC to loan within seven days the $20,000.00 to Petersen or Petersen would either declare a forefeiture of the
January 22, 1966 Agreement or institute a legal action
for specific performance or damages (Exh. 9-P). Within a day or two after receiving the demand letter, Mr.
Whiteley of ICC went to the home of Petersen and
asked what the least he could get by with until they
could do something better, and Petersen responded that
he really needed $5,000.00. Mr. 'Vhiteley then promised
to come up with at least $5,000.00, which was arranged
for and consummated on May 12, 1967 (R. 71, 72). That
$5,000.00 Note was secured by a Mortgage on a Salt
Lake City property rather than the 'Vyoming Property
to accommodate Petersen. Mr. 'Vhiteley had requested
the Wyoming Property be used as security but Petersen
indicated there was not time to get a title report ( R. 74,
75).
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Over two years later, on July 7, 1969, Petersen filed
their law suit for damages against ICC, after ICC's
auditor ha<l requested confirmation of the $5,000.00
Note from Petersen, which had not been paid (R. 73).
No effort was made to bring that case to trail until suit
was brought on the $5,00.00 Note in December 1971
after which time the two cases were consolidated.

I

On October 1, 1966, almost four months before expiration of the year provided for in the January 22, 1966
Agreement, Petersen sold the W yarning Properties Ull·
der a Uniform Real Estate Contract to James S ..Mill·
iron, with a $17,000.00 credit or down payment and
$50,2000.00 to be paid over a period of years at $3,600.00
per year with interest at 6 per cent per annum. Para·
graph 6 of said contract also showed the existence of an
encumbrance and obligation against the properties in
favor of the Bank of Salt Lake in the sum of $12,000.00
(Exh. 4-D).
Furthermore, in January 1967 Petersen had talked
with Milliron about discounting the contract for cash
(R. 49, 50). On lVIay 5, 1967, seven days before the
$5,000.00 loan was made to Petersen by ICC, Petersen
in fact discounted the contract to Milliron for cash and
had no further interest or security in the 'Vyoming
Properties to pledge to ICC (Exh. 16-P, R. 50).
None of these facts concerning l\filliron was made
known to ICC by Petersen, and ICC was not otherwise
aware of these facts until long after May 12, 1967 (R.
63, 73).
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In a<lditioll, it was for the first time learned at the
trial of these cases Ly ICC and their counsel that at the
time of the $5,000.00 loan on l\Iay 12, 1967 by ICC,
Petersen simply never intended to pay back that
$5,000.00 loan ( R. 66, 67). Further, ICC would not
have made the loan of $5,000.00 to Petersen had Petersen disclosed these facts ( R. 73, 7 4) .

ARGUlVIENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FINDING THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE
PARTIES VVAIVED AND/OR EXTENDED
SPECIFIC PER.FORlVIANCE OF THE JANUARY 2i, 1966 AGREEMENT, AND THAT THE
PROl\lISSORY NOTE AND l\IORTGAGE EXECUTED IN EXCHANGE FOR $5,000.00 CONSTITUTED AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.
Appellants Points I and II of their argument shall
be treated and answered together in respondent's Point
I. However, it should be particularly noted that if the
lower court correctly found on any one of the points that
appellants assign as error, to-wit; ( 1) That the conduct
of Petersen created an impossible situation, which would
and did prevent ICC from performing the January 22,
19f)6 agreement as to the $20,000.00 loan ,or ( 2) that
the $5,000.00 note and mortgage dated l\Iay 12, 1967
5

constituted an accord and satisfaction, or ( 3) that spe.
cific performance by ICC of the January 22, 1966 agree.
ment was waived and/ or extended by the actions of the
parties, then the trial court's decision of dismissing
Petersens case for damages for breach of contract and
awarding judgment in favor of ICC on their note and
mortgage must be upheld by this court.
The trial court simply found no basis for breach of
the January 22, 1966 agreement, as far as ICC was con.
cerned. In that agreement (Exh. 8-P) paragraph 5 it
states as fallows:
"Intermountain also agrees to loan Petersen
$20,000.00 within one year from the date of the
execution of their agreement. The time that said
loan is to be made within said one year period
shall be determined solely by Intermountain.
Said indebtedness shall be evidenced by a promissory note providing for the payment of the principal amount of $20,000.00 plus interest at the
rate of 93 per annum on the unpaid balance in
three ( 3) equal annual installments. Payment of
said indebtedness shall be secured by a first mort·
gage on the Wyoming properties."
This paragraph 5 is the only portion of the entire
agreement that is in controversy. It was a promise by
ICC to loan money in exchange for a return promise by
Petersen to give a first mortgage on the Wyoming prop·
erties as security and to be paid back in 3 annual pay·
ments at 93 interest.
It is apparent from the facts in the case that the
parties by mutual consent, or by their actions intended
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aud actually did exteud the time of performance of these
promises beyond the years time of January 22, 1967,
me11tioned in said paragraph 5 ( R. 46, 47, 59, 61, 62, 70).
Counsel for appellants seems to admit this fact also as
stated in his Brief at pages 7 to 9 wherein the conversations between the parties were noted. Then, in the last
paragraph on page 9 counsel states:
"The conversations between Petersen and \Vhiteley show that both of them recognized that the
original agreement was still to be performed."
Also in the record at page 70, lines 18 to 26, ~Ir.
Whiteley testified as follows:
"So we were in bad circumstances for working
capital, and we explained this to Mr. Petersen,
and I know there were several meetings after the
years time when he indicated that he needed the
money and he needed it badly, and at each time
we told him we were doing all we could and we
were expecting to have some money in and we
hoped that we would be able to handle it but
could he please wait a little longer. And on each
occasion he said, 'alright, let me know when you
can do something. I will wait.' "

It is also obvious that Petersen had waived and/ or
extended specific performance of the $20,000.00 loan
promise beyond January 22, 1967, by his letter, through
his attorney, to ICC of April 5, 1967 (Exh. 9-P). The
letter states as follows:
"Demand is hereby made upon you to advance
$20,000.00 to the Petersens according to the
terms of the agreement within seven days from
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the date of this letter. In the event you fail to do
so, Petersens will either declare a forfeiture of
the agreement and proceed to regain their inter·
est in the Travelodge lHotel, or institute legal ac·
tion for specific performance or damages."
In other words ICC was given 7 days from April 5,
1967 to comply with the demand and to make arrange·
ments with Petersen. ICC through lVhiteley, thereupon
made arrangements, within a matter of 2 days, to satisfy
Petersen with a promise to come up with $5,000.00 as a
loan. This was then consummated by lVIay l~, 1967.
Consequently, there was no breach by ICC of the
January 22, 1966 agreement, for the parties had acqui·
esced in or consented to an extension of and/ or a waiving of the time of performance, at least to lVIay 12, 1967,
when the $5,000.00 was loaned. It is also obvious that
after May 12, 1967, there was no way that ICC could
have breached paragraph 5 of the agreement mentioned,
for Petersen had in fact repudiated said paragraph 5 in
doing away completely with the 'Vyoming properties,
the security upon which the $20,000.00 loan was to be
based, as of May 5, 1967 (Exh. 16-P, R. 50). There is
therefore ample evidence from the facts and testimony
in this case to support the trial courts findings and con·
clusion on this point.
It is also well settled in the law that there may be a
waiver by approval or acceptance of performance differ·
ent from the agreement made. In 17 Am. J ur. 2nd page
838, section 393, it states:
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''As a general principle, the performance of conditions or of promises is dispensed with when it is
waived by acceptance of performance differing
from the performance required by the contract.
Such acceptance may be express or it may be implied from conduct."
In 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, page 835, section 390, we read:
"Strict and full performance of a contract by one
party may be waived by the other party, irt which
case there is, to the extent of the waiver, no right
to damages for the failure to perform strictly or
fully."
Then again in the same section 390 at page 836 and
837, we quote:
"An unexplained delay in enforcing a contract
may constitute evidence of waiver and acquiescence in nonperformance."
Our case comes within these general principles, in
light of Petersen's acquiescing in the delay for the loan
beyond January 22, 1967 and in light of his demand
letter of April 5, 1967, his acceptance of the $5,000.00
loan on lVIay 12, 1967, and finally his unexplained delay
in trying to enforce the alleged contract provisions over
two years later.
Furthermore, on May 12, 1967, when ICC loaned
~5,000.00 to Petersen and was induced to take different
security than was called for in paragraph 5 of the agreement, it simply had to be in lieu of and in satisfaction of
the obligations and promises stated in said paragraph 5
and thus constituted :in accord and satisfaction of any
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claim Petersen may have had. It was either an accord
and satisfaction, or it was a fraud upon ICC, or perhaps
both, for on .lVIay 12, 1967 when Petersen accepted the
$5,000.00 loan he knew he could in no way provide the
Wyoming properties as security for a $20,000.00 loan,
for he had completely disposed of it on May 5, 1967.
It is clear from the evidence that Petersen consid·
ered that $5,000.00 to be the only loan he was going to
get from ICC. Counsel for appeIIants quoted from the
record at page 63 part of the testimony of Petersen on
cross-examination where Petersen admitted that on May
12, 1967, he asked for $20,000.00 from ICC and was told
they could not loan that sum, but did come up with
$5,000.00. However, counsel failed to quote the next two
questions and answers which are pertinent. They are as
follows:
Q. "Now, why-now, let me ask you this. Did
you ever disclose to him that you had sold the
property in Wyoming?

A.No.
Q. Then why were you insisting on $20,000.00

even after May 5th when you disposed of all of
that property, knowing that you could not have
given security for the $20,000.00?
A. The reason I asked him was I was just won·
dering if he would have ever paid me the
$20,000.00, and, second, knowing that I had dis·
counted the contract $20,000.00 I felt he owed
that $20,000.00 in damages."

It is apparent, then, that even though ICC did not
fully realize (because of the non disclosure) on May 12,
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Hlu7, the complete satisfaction of the January 22, 1966
agreement by the $5,000.00 loan, Petersen knew it, real-

ized it and accepted it in that light, and cannot now deny
it or take advantage of the situation, for ICC accepted
the fact 011ce they had knowledge of the true circumstances. vV e believe that this situation comes within the
definition of accord and satisfaction as set out by this
court in Brou.111ing v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of
the U.S., 94 Utah .532, 72 P 2nd 1060 ( 1937) Reh. den.
94 Utah 570, 80 P 2nd 348 ( 1939) :
"An accord is an agreement between parties, one
to give or perform, the other to receive or accept,
such agreed payment or performance in satisfaction of a claim. The 'satisfaction' is the consumation of such agreement."
In our case a $5,000.00 loan was given or performed
by ICC in place of a $20,000.00 loan and the recipient
accepting the same was Petersen. The consideration was
an acceptance by ICC of security less than and different
from the Wyoming properties previously agreed upon.
The trial court therefore, properly ruled that the
actions of the parties waived and/ or extended specific
performance of the January 22, 1966 agreement, and
thus there was no breach by ICC, and further the loan
of $5,000.00, on May 12, 1967 constituted an accord and
satisfaction.
POINT II
TlIE CONDUCT AND ACTIONS OF
PETERSEN CREATED AN IMPOSSIBLE
11

SITUATION, 'VI-IICH DID PREVENT OR
EXCUSE ICC FRO~I PER.FOR~IING THE
AGREElHENT AS TO THE $20,000.00 LOAN
REFERRED TO IN THE JANUARY 22, 196u
AGREEMENT.
Since the money market was so tight during Hl6u
and 1967, the only way ICC would loan $20,000.00 to
Petersen was on the condition and promise of repayment
in three equal annual installments, at 9 % interest ana
secured by a First Mortgage on the 'Vyoming Properties, of substantial value, being in excess of $67 ,000.00.
On October l, 1966, almost four months before the
year was up, which was provided for in the January 22,
1966 agreement for making the loan, at ICC's option,
Petersen sold the Wyoming Properties on contract to
James Milliron and this was not disclosed to I CC ( Exh.
4-d; R. 63, 73) .

Counsel for appellants would have us believe that
this action of Petersen made no difference, that he was
still entitled to a $20,000.00 loan regardless of his en·
cumbering the security. However, Paragraph 5 of the
agreement created dependent promises. Petersen had no
right to rely on ICC's promise to loan $20,000.00 if ICC
could not rely on Petersen's promise to pay it back in
three annual payments, meaning over $6,600.00 per year
plus 9 % interest, with the Wyoming Properties as se·
curity (First Mortgage). Petersen could not force or
require ICC to take substitute security, even if it had
been available, any more than ICC could have forced a
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suLstitutc loan upon Petersen without changing the
agreement or hy mutual consent of the parties. Ther..:
~was also no evidence in the record that Petersen ha<l
other security of the value of the W yenning Properties.
When Petersen sold the properties to Milliron he
changed the security in such a way that he made it impossible for him to perform his part of the agreement.
The contract with Milliron provided for $3,600.00 annual payments and 6 % interest. The security Yalue was
reduced $17,000.00 and in addition another $12,000.00,
encumbrance was shown with the Bank of Salt Lake.
Paragraph 8 of said contract also states:
"The Seller is given the option to secure, execute
and maintain loans secured by said property of
not to exceed the then unpaid contract balance
hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to
exceed six per cent per annum and payable in
regular installments; provided that the aggregate
monthly installment payments required to be
made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater
than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract."
Petersen had therefore obligated himself, under
that contract, in October 1966, not to make loans on that
property that would exceed 6% interest per annum and
where the annual payments would not exceed $3,600.00.
It was, therefore, not possible under that contract for
Petersen to use the Wyoming Properties as security
with ICC, where 9% interest was to be charged and over
$6,600.00 was to paid annually.

13

Counsel for Appellants argues, however, that Mill.
iron would have agreed to change the contract to ac.
commodate Petersen, but their statement is only hearsa)
and self serving and does not change the contractual
facts, and is of little value in light of the further faci
that Petersen did not reveal to ICC this sale until lo11g
after he had obtained some money from them.
Now where the promises of the parties are depend.
ent, 01· amount to a counter promise, or a co11dition pre.
cedent, as in our case, Petersen simply has no standing i11
Court and cannot recover on his alleged claim for Bread
of Contract for failure of ICC to loan $20,000.00, unles1
Petersen was able to perform his part of the promise or
condition for the loan and provide the security as agreed.
In 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, Section 362, at Page 805, it
states this general rule:
"Generally, therefore, the performance of a de·
pendent promise or covenant is a condition to re·
covery on the counterpromise or countercore·
nant .... The rule is that it is a good defense to an
action on a contract that the obligation to per·
form the act required was dependent upon some
other thing which the other party was to do and
has failed to do."
Also in 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, 898 Section 441, it states:

"It is held that a party who seeks to recover dam·
ages from the other party to a contract for a
breach must show that he himself is free from
fault in respect to performance of a dependent
promise, or counterpromise, or a condition prece·
dent."

14
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Furthermore, in Secti011 355 of 17 Am. J ur. 2nd at
Pages 792-793, we read:
"In the case of concurrent obligations the party
seeking the legal enforcement of the stipulation
of the other must first show a compliance with
his own. On principles of general justice, if the
acts are to be done at the same time, neither party
to such a contract can claim a fulfillment thereof,
unless he has first performed or is ready to perform all acts required on his own part."
Again this subject is treated in 17 Am. J ur. 2nd,
880, Section 425 as follows:

ii
If

"If the impossibility of performance arises directly or even indirectly from the acts of the
promisee, it is sufficient excuse for nouperformance. This is upon the principle that he who prevents a thing may not avail himself of the nonperformance which he has occasioned."
"It is also the rule that a party may not insist
upon the performance of a contract or a provision
thereof where he himself is guilty of a material or
substantial breach of that contract or provision.
The party first committing a substantial breach
of a contract cannot maintain an action against
the other contracting party for a subsequent failure to perform a promise, if the promises are dependent. A failure to perform a promise, the performance of which is a condition precedent, is an
excuse for nonperformance of the promise or
promises made by the other Party."

The annotation in 84 A.L.R. 2nd, Section 12 (b) at
Page 6.5 under the heading "Impossibility caused or preventable or remediable by promisee," further emphasizes:
15

"A standard treatise states that if the impossibil.
ity of performance arises directly or indirecth
from the acts of the promisee, it is a sufficient ex.
cuse for nonperformance by the promisor. This i~
upon the principle that he who prevents a thin~
may not avail himself of the nonperformanct
which he has occasioned. Nonperformance of a
contract in accordance with its terms is excuseo
if performance is prevented by the conduct of tht
adverse party."
On January 22, 1967, Petersen was not able to corn·
ply with his part of the agreement even if he had made a
proper demand. \Vhen Petersen finally did make a demand for performance by ICC on April 5, 1967 ano
ICC managed to come up with $5,000.00 in response to
that demand, Petersen induced ICC to take other seem·
ity than the \Vyoming Properties, knowing that he coulo
not comply with his part of the agreement. This wa1
tantamount to nullifying the agreement. In 84< A.L.R.
2nd at Page 32, wherein the question of impossibility of
performance is annotated, it states:
"Williston comments that existing impossibility
known to one party and not to the other would
probably render the transaction voidable for
fraud."
Also it states at 17 Am. J ur. 2nd, Section 403,
Pages 850 and 851 as follows:
"Ignorance of facts warranting or excusing non·
performance or repudiation of the contract doe1
not affect the right to assert such facts, after the~
are discovered as such justification or excuse.
A party sued for breach of contract may ordi-
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If there was any question about the repudiation of
Paragraph 5 of the January 22, 1966 agreemeut by
Petersen in October 1966, there should be no question
about it by ~lay .5, 1967 when Petersen disposed of all
the
yoming Properties and still kept I CC dangling
and in the dark on his true intentions. \Ve, thereLre,
submit that the trial court had ample evidence aud law
to sustain its conclusion that Petersen's conduct and actions did create an impossible situation and did prevent
or excuse ICC from performing as to the $20,000.00
loan.
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NO'l' ERR IN
DIS1\1ISSING PETERSEN'S C0.1\IPLAINT UPON ITS ~IERITS AND 'VITH PREJUDICE.
There is sufficient evidence and law to support the
lower courts findings and conclusions on all of the points
discussed in this Brief, in dismissing Petersen's Complaint for damages, but we reiterate that the court would
be justified in its ruling on any one of said issues.
Contrary to counsel for appellants' statement,
ICC's answer does not admit to any breach of contract.
It denies a refusal to loan $20,000.00 to Petersen and
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then sets out several affirmative defens es. There wa
also no evidence of breach.
Furthermore, the action of Petersen in selling th1
\Vyoming Properties in October of 1966, before the tilllt
had expired for performance by ICC, and obtai11i111
$17,000.00 in cash or property as a down payment thert
fore negates any argument of counsel for Petersen tha:
he suffered any damages that could be attributed !1
I CC on the loan. It was not as though I CC owe1J
$20,000.00 to Petersen. If the loan had been made 0
$20,000.00, it would have to be paid back and securn
by the '¥ yoming Properties, but Petersen had alread)
obtained $17,000.00 on those Properties and so he can;
"have his cake and eat it too," as he was apparent!)
trying to do, and then hold ICC for damages.
1

The lower court was, therefore, justified in dismiss·
ing Petersen's Complaint under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In the trial of this case, many of the facts were stip·
plated to and there was no real controversy or absenc:
of supporting proof on the issues. Thus, the Supremt
Court must follow the findings and judE,rrnent of tht
lower court. (See Whittaker vs. Ferguson, 16 U. 24~.
51 P. 980).

It is quite obvious that by October 1966, Peterseu
could see that money was tight and difficult to obtaiu
and so he sold the Wyoming Properties, and although hi
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liad repudiated his part of the agreement of January 2~,

Petersen continued to press for the loan of money
from ICC. Had ICC known of the sale to Milliron, that
would have ended the problem because ICC would have
made no further attempts to obtain money to try and
satisfy, what they thought was their continuing obligation. Then when the demand letter of April 5, 1967
came, I CC did manage to come up with $5,000.00 to
satisfy that demand. Therefore, on May 12, 1067 when
the $5,000.00 loan was consummated, and in view of the
fact that on May 5, 1967, Petersen had completely done
away with the Wyoming Properties, had failed to disdose this to ICC, and had no intention to pay the money
back, the obligation (if any) on the part of ICC had
been completely satisfied as to the January 22, 1966
agreement.
H.166,

Consequently, the lower court's decision in dismissing Petersen's Complaint and rendering judgment in
favor of ICC on the $5,000.00 note and mortgage, together with interest and attorneys fees should be upheld.
Respectfully submitted,
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR., for
SPAFFORD & YOUNG
Attorneys for DefendantRespondent
2188 Highland Drive

Salt Lake City, Utah
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